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P r e f a c e
“ How fortunate for leaders, that the masses do  not think.”
-  Adolph Hitler
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V“The only thing w e have to fear is fear itself.” 
-  President Franklin D. Roosevelt
“Today's terrorists can  strike a t any place, a t any time, and with a w ide
variety of weapons.”
-  President George W. Bush
“The one means that wins the easiest victory over reason -  terror and
force."
-  Adolph Hitler
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vi
List o f  Tab les
Ta ble  1: Su m m a r y  o f  Re g r e s s io n  A n a lys is  fo r  V a r iab les  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the Ex e c u t iv e  Br a n c h  (Fear  o f  W a l k in g ) ...................................................................................... 2 5
Ta ble  2 : Su m m a r y  o f  R e g r e s s io n  A n a lys is  fo r  V a r iab les  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the  J u d ic ia l  Br a n c h  (Fear  o f  W a l k in g ) ......................................................................................... 2 6
Ta ble  3 : Su m m a r y  o f  Re g r e s s io n  A n a ly s is  fo r  V a r iab les  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the Le g is la t iv e  B r a n c h  (F e ar  o f  W a l k in g ) ................................................................................... 2 7
T a b le  4 : S u m m a ry  o f  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s is  f o r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
th e  E x e c u tiv e  B r a n c h  (B e lie f t h a t  USA w i l l  be in  WWIII in  n e x t 10 y e a r s ) .....................29
T ab le  5 : S u m m a ry  o f  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s is  f o r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
th e  J u d ic ia l  B r a n c h  (B e lie f t h a t  USA w i l l  be in  WWIII in  n e x t 10 y e a r s ) ........................30
Ta ble  6 : S u m m a r y  o f  Re g r e s s io n  A n a ly s is  fo r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the Le g is la t iv e  B r a n c h  (B elief th a t  USA w ill  be in  WWIII in  next 10 y e a r s )  31
Ta ble  7 : Su m m a r y  o f  Re g r e s s io n  A n a lys is  fo r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the  Ex e c u t iv e  B r a n c h  (B elief th a t  O ther P e o p le  c a n  be Trusted ) ...................................... 3 2
Ta ble  8 : S u m m a r y  o f  Re g r e s s io n  A n a lys is  f o r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
the J u d ic ia l  B r a n c h  (B elief th a t  O ther P e o p le  c a n  be Trusted ) ......................................... 3 3
T ab le  9 : S u m m a ry  o f  R e g re s s io n  A n a ly s is  f o r  V a r ia b le s  P r e d ic t in g  C o n f id e n c e  in  
th e  L e g is la t iv e  B r a n c h  (B e lie f t h a t  O th e r  P e o p le  c a n  be T ru s te d ) ...................................34
Ta ble  10 : Sa m p l e  sizes. M e an s  a n d  St a n d a r d  D e v ia t io n s  f o r  C o n f id e n c e  Levels by 
Se x ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3 5
Ta ble  1 1 : Sa m p l e  sizes, M e a n s , a n d  St a n d a r d  D e v ia t io n s  fo r  C o n f id e n c e  Levels  by 
Ed u c a t io n ........................................................................................................................................................3 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A b s t r a c t
TELEVISION EXPOSURE, FEELINGS OF FEAR AND CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED 




University of New Hampshire, September, 2006
This study examines the relation betw een television m edia and fear as it 
pertains to  the trust or confidence in the United States government. Using 
the fundam ental hypothesis of cultivation theory (i.e., heavy viewers of 
television are more likely to believe that the world is a “ m ean and scary” 
p lace), the relation between the am ount of television one watches, one ’s 
corresponding level of fear, and one ’s level o f confidence in each 
branch of fhe United States federal governm ent is examined. It is 
hypothesized that fear will have a m ediating e ffect on the relation 
between heavy television consumption and respondents’ confidence in 
each branch of fhe federal government. It is further proposed tha t a 
“ culture of fear” is deliberately created by the m edia and governm ent as 
a means of social control.
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CHAPTER 1
I n t r o d u c t io n : Th e  O n l y  Th in g  W e H a v e  To  Fe a r  is Fe a r  Itself
The United States is a nation gripped by fear. Fear of the unknown, 
fear of crime, fear of terrorism. This begs the question, why are w e so 
fearful? Beyond this, are our fears legitimate? Or are they merely the 
sinister creations of politicians, governm ent agencies and the media 
em ployed for the purpose of social control? Surely the latter is impossible 
-  or is it? Indeed, there are dangers that exist in society that the prudent 
citizen should be aware of and take all reasonable measures to avoid. 
However, the anxiety, distrust, and willingness to to lerate limitations to our 
civil liberties and freedoms that seem to pervade our nation may be 
attributed to an unjustified fear created  by the workings of the 
government and mass m edia.
The potential for increased social control and reliance on fhe state 
offers a very com pelling motive for the deliberate creation of a “ culture of 
fear” by governments, to be discussed in greater deta il later. “ Fearful 
people are more dependent, more easily m anipulated and controlled. 
They may a cce p t and even w e lcom e repression if it promises to relieve 
their insecurities” (Gerbner, 1981, pp 5-6). If even a small degree of social 
control can be achieved through this “ culture of fear,” surely there is 
motive to  implement such measures.
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The purpose of this study is to determ ine the relation, if any, 
between television media and fear as it pertains to the trust or confidence 
in the United States government. Specifically, da ta  regarding 
respondents’ television viewing habits, levels of fear and levels of 
confidence in each branch of the federal governm ent will be examined.
This research will not only add  to the existing body of literature on 
the top ic of fear and media influence, but will contribute uniquely in that 
it will provide insight into the e ffect of this fear on confidence in the 
federal government. Based on extensive research and review of the 
literature in preparation for this study it is believed that this relation has not 
yet been investigated at length.
If it becomes evident that exposure to television is significantly 
related to an increase in fear am ong populations and consequently, an 
increase in confidence in their governm ent to make decisions for them, it 
is troubling to think of the possible ramifications of such fear — how far 
would a population in fear be willing to go to protect itself? What rights 
would they be willing to give up? Surely it is a frightening thought to 
imagine a nation sacrificing its constitutional rights on the basis of irrational 
fears created by the collusion of the governm ent and media.
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M ass M e d ia  &  the C u l t iv a t io n  Th e o r y
Cultivation theory is a concep t that focuses on the influence of the 
mass media on the attitudes and perceptions of reality of people. 
Accord ing to cultivation theory, those who w atch  four or more hours per 
day are labeled heavy television viewers, while those who view less then 
four hours per day are light viewers (Gerbner, 1976b). Heavy viewers are 
exposed to more violence and therefore are a ffec ted  by w hat cultivation 
theory calls “ Mean World Syndrome,” the idea that the world is a far more 
violent, m ean and scary p lace  than reality would ind icate (Gerbner, 
1976b).
Accord ing to Gerbner, the overuse of television is creating a 
homogeneous and fearful populace. As audiences rely on the m edia for 
information and interpretation, there is a tendency to believe more in the 
reality o f m edia fictions than in the objective reality surrounding them. The 
question then becomes, is the m edia portrayal of the world at large an 
accura te  representation? Anyone who has w a tched  television for even a 
brief period of time could tell us that the answer is a resounding “ no.” 
Gerbner’s theory of cultivation states that heavy exposure to mass media, 
namely television, creates and cultivates attitudes more consistent with a 
m edia conjured version of reality than with w hat actua l reality is -  
cultivation therefore is the long-term socialization and “enculturation” of
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the television aud ience in learning, understanding and accep ting  the 
various characters, roles and behaviors people play in society (Gerbner & 
Gross, 1976b). The cultivation theory asserts that heavy viewers' attitudes 
are cultivated primarily by w hat they w atch  on television.
Gerbner and Gross illustrate cultivation theory by describing a cave- 
dweller whose only connection to the outside world is through a television 
in his cave. They assert that if one ’s knowledge of the real world is based 
exclusively on the images and stories seen on television, it would stand to 
reason that o n e ’s perceptions and understanding about the real world 
would be largely derived from their view of television-based reality 
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976a).
In regards to the current study, this theory of cultivation is most 
relevant as it pertains to television violence and fear-inducing media. 
Cantor (2002) exam ined the effects of fear-inducing mass m edia and 
concluded tha t “ the fear induced by mass media exposure is often long 
lasting, with sometimes intense and debilitating effects for its audiences” 
(p. 289). This study also revealed a variety of intense reactions, including 
generalized anxieties, specific fears, unwanted recurring thoughts, and 
disturbances in eating and sleeping.
In addition, research on m edia violence has suggested that 
exposure to violent content on television can lead viewers to perceive life 
as scary, dangerous, and fearful. Cultivation theory states that heavy
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viewers o f television will perceive the world as a “ m ean and scary 
p lace." Television often distorts crime by over-representing more severe, 
intentional, and gruesome incidents. Due to this, audiences tend to 
believe that such incidents are far more frequent, thus misperceiving 
reality (Heath & Gilbert, 1996).
M ass M e d ia  &  the  C ulture o f  Fear
Accord ing to Altheide and other m edia scholars, the mass media 
(specifically television media) are the principal contributors to the 
discourse of fear that pervades the popular culture today. “ Fear has 
becom e a staple of popular culture, ranging from fun to dread.
Americans trade on fear. News agencies report it, produce entertainm ent 
messages, and prom ote it” (Altheide, 1999, p. 480). Beyond that, police 
and other formal agencies of social control market it. Audiences w a tch  it, 
read it, and accord ing  to numerous mass entertainm ent spokespersons, 
dem and it. It is virtually impossible to turn on a television set w ithout 
bearing witness to a program in which the central issue is violent, brutal, or 
fear-inducing. It is believed by some that when a sense of fear is 
established in a population, it is the governm ent that reaps the benefits. A 
“ heightened sense of risk and insecurity is more likely to increase 
acquiescence to and dependence  upon established authority, and to 
legitimize its use of force (Dowling, 1986, p. 20).” Certainly this submission
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to authority is not the standard for all people, as not every citizen merely 
complies with tyranny, even in an atmosphere of fear (people engage in 
a great variety of actions to undermine the illegitimate authority of 
governments perpetuating such fe a r-c iv il disobedience, protests, 
lobbying, am ong others). However, past research has shown that there is 
a tendency for heavy viewers of television to “ give in to authority, as they 
are more likely to show bias against civil liberties" (Potter, 1999, p. 36). 
Previous research has also revealed that heavy viewers of television 
programming are more likely to exhibit a greater level of fear. It has also 
been suggested that a general sense of fear may be a “ natural reaction” 
to the images that are dep ic ted  on television every day (Dowler, 2003, p. 
120).
“Culture of fear” is a term proposed in a variety of sociological 
theses, which argue that feelings of fear and anxiety predom inate in 
contem porary public discourse and relationships, changing how we 
relate to one another as individuals and as dem ocratic agents (Heath & 
Gilbert, 1996). Heath and Gilbert found that “although m edia messages 
only a ffec t some of the people some of the time, the mass media 
definitely plays a role in stimulating fear in society, in genera l” (p. 385).
In m any countries, this culture of fear is em ployed as a means of 
social control. Governments use mass com m unication and the m edia to 
keep the population in fear, carefully crafting public opinion toward the
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interests of the political elite. The potential for increased social control 
that a mistrustful and mutually fearing population m ight offer to  those in 
power is surely an attractive motive for the scaremongering tactics 
em ployed in the creation of this culture of fear.
M ass M e d ia  &  So c ia l  C o n t r o l : Te le v is io n  v . Print  M e d ia
In to d a y ’s society, we can  see that fear permeates all aspects of 
our lives. We fear violence. We fear disease. We fear war. Certainly, we 
fear the unknown. Television news drives much of this fear, due to the very 
nature of its medium. Past research has shown that the “ cultivating 
images presented in the television world do not differ dram atically from 
the images o f social reality presented in other m edia” (Signorielli &
Morgan, 1994, p. 114). However, in a groundbreaking study performed by 
Chircoros, Eschholz and Gertz (1997) tha t examined the effects of 
television consumption in relation to fear, it was determ ined that “while 
significantly higher levels of fear are expressed by viewers of television 
news, the reading of newspapers has no apparent relationship to fear” 
(p.348).
Television serves as an im portant source of information for most 
Americans about events that occur around the world every day (Wanta, 
Golan & Lee, 2004). The repetition of certain stories and specific agendas 
using television allows for the shaping of the opinions and views of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
television audience. By distracting oneself with these stories, the 
television audience is able to keep fears that are more proximate a t bay. 
Television provides a service for “ individuals who w atch  [the stories] and 
for the politicians who make use of them to garner votes and evade 
discussions of other policies and problems” (Glassner, 1999, p. 304). For 
both the television aud ience and the governm ent alike, “ alarming stories 
about invented or exaggerated dangers and social trends can keep fears 
of bona fide troubles a t bay” (Glassner, 1999, p. 308).
When w e examine the critical differences betw een print m edia and 
television, the findings of Chircoros, et al. (1997) should com e as no great 
surprise. Television is more readily accessible for mass consumption than 
most forms of print m edia. Access to the television is available to virtually 
every person, in virtually every home in the United States, twenty-four 
hours per day. Television has the power to influence more than current 
trends—it also has an im pact on the attitudes and knowledge of the 
television audience. Also, “ television usage does not require the same 
levels of liferacy, incom e or “ in teraction” as newspapers and the internet 
(and movies or theatrical productions, for that matter), therefore making it 
(television) more accessible to a greater number of people than its m edia 
counterparts” (Ragsdale, 2003, p. 18). It is this w idespread access that 
enables television to influence society to a greater degree than other 
forms of media.
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M ass M e d ia . A g e n d a -S etting  Po l ic y  &  C iv il  L iberties
Past research has shown that there exists a symbiotic relationship 
between mass m edia and fear. Fears are carefully c reated and 
repeatedly fed by the mass m edia—through the m anipulation of words, 
facts, news, sources or da ta , in order to  induce certain personal 
behaviors, justify governm ental actions or policies (at hom e or abroad), 
keep people consuming, e lect certain politicians, or distract the public's 
attention from allegedly more urgent social issues like poverty, social 
security, unemployment, crime or pollution. This sort of agenda-setting, as 
it is called, is how "problems becom e salient as political issues around 
which policy alternatives can  be defined and support or opposition can  
be  crystallized” (Erbring, G oldenberg & Miller, 1980, p. 17).
News selection is a t the heart of the agenda-setting process.
Limited by time and space, news directors often are restricted in their 
selection of only a handful of stories, while dozens of news stories are left 
off the air (Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004). With the dependency of mass 
media upon major sources of news in this selection process, particularly 
the government, it is believed by some that governments use mass m edia 
to create a culture of fear on populations in order to m anufacture 
consent for questionable policy. Fear is an amazing m otivator. When
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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personal safety is believed to be jeopardized, logic and objectivity are 
lost. For many, freedom  seems a small price for protection.
By using graphic images, focusing only on w ha t those in power (be 
it the governm ent or the network executives) w ant the television 
aud ience to see and hear, and by shaping events so that they fit the 
political agenda of those in power, the m edia acts as a very powerful 
extension of the federal government. It is im portant to note that a lthough 
the United States does not have state-controlled m edia as some other 
countries that em ploy fear-mongering tactics as a means of social 
control, the governm ent and the m edia often work hand-in-hand to 
accomplish mutually beneficial goals. Researchers have agreed that, 
under certain circumstances, “ the news m edia do tell people w hat to 
think by providing the public with an agenda  of attributes—a list of 
characferistics of im portanf newsmakers” (Wanta, Golan & Lee, 2004, p. 
364). For example, Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004), in their a ttem pt to 
examine the influence of m edia coverage on perceptions of foreign 
nations, dem onstrated a clear relationship between such coverage and 
how individuals viewed foreign nations (both positive and negative 
coverage) -  their results illustrate the effects of television framing and 
Gerbner’s cultivation theory quite clearly.
It is w idely understood by governments that state propaganda, 
when supported by the educa ted  classes (i.e. the political elite) and
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when no deviation is perm itted from it, can  have an enormous e ffect. 
What better w ay to prom ulgate state propaganda than mass m edia? 
Throughout history, governments have used mass m edia to create  a sense 
of apprehension, or fear, in their country ’s population. When w e examine 
the agenda-setting phenom enon from a historical perspective, w e 
discover that mass media has been used to create tension and fear as a 
means of social control by many governments and political figures. Adolf 
Hifler used radio broadcasts, c inem atic newsreels, posters and 
propaganda as a form of social control in Nazi Germany, influencing 
thousands to do his will (Chomsky, 2002). Around the same time, the 
Wilson administration em ployed similar tactics through a governm ent 
propaganda commission in order “ drive a reluctant population into a war 
by terrifying them and eliciting jingoist fanaticism” (Chomsky, 2002, p. 6). 
Following World War I, President Wilson again em ployed m edia 
manipulation through newsprint, radio broadcasts and print m edia in 
order to whip up a hysterical Red Scare, as it was called, which 
a ttem pted  to elim inate such dangerous problems as union organization 
and freedom  of political thought. President Wilson enjoyed very strong 
support from the m edia and from the business sector, which ensured that 
the operation would have great success (Chomsky, 2002).
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9 / 1 1 :  A  N a t io n  in  Te r r o r
When w e look at the present in light of the past, w e can  see that 
the collusion of the governm ent and the m edia in order to shape the 
views and beliefs of the public continues even today. The current “ War on 
Terrorism” can  be seen as a prime example of how political agendas are 
used to generate fear within populations. President Bush speaks about 
“ evil ones” and "evil doers.” The nation remains on “ alert.” The next a ttack 
could com e at any time.
Media coverage of certain events (such as terrorist attacks, violent 
crime, etc.) has been shown to be re lated to an increase in fear, anxiety 
and xenophobia am ong television audiences (Ragsdale, 2 0 0 3 ) .  This sense 
of fear has been used by politicians to  “justify centralization of authority, 
stripping aw ay of citizens' rights, surveillance and executions, with 
politicians in both parties calling for still broader governm ent powers and 
increased expenditure to fight the g lobal war on terrorism” (Barnet, 1 9 9 6 , 
p. 2 ). Apparently their tactics are working—a recent poll conducted  by 
FOX News ind ica ted that more than half (54%) of those polled w ould be 
willing to give up personal freedoms in order to reduce the threat of 
terrorism (FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll. May 1 6 -1 8 , 2 0 0 6 ) ,  while a 
study at the University of Florida found that close to 6 0 %  of all those polled 
answered that “ terrorism, bombings or other crises” are justification for the
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governments suspending the civil rights of the people (Ragsdale, 2003, 
p. 84).
The events of September 11th constitute a pivotal m om ent in the 
history of the United States. In the months following the attacks, the Bush 
Administration was accused of using television and the m edia to keep the 
patriotic faithful glued to the idea that we are being threatened. It has 
been said that the Bush administration has used fhe mass m edia to 
m anipulate and deceive in ways “suited to the trappings of American 
culture as surely as Goebbels shaped Hitler's speeches to the German 
volksgeist” (Wasserman, 2005, p. 1).
Some believe that the attacks of September 11 have becom e a
focusing event for news m edia and policy agendas. Researchers have
defined a focusing event as an event that is:
“ sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably 
defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of 
potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or 
suggests potential harms that are or could be 
concentra ted  on a definable geographica l area 
or com m unity of interest, and that is known to 
policy makers and the public virtually 
simultaneously" (Birkland, 2004, p. 22).
A considerable am ount of research has been conducted  over the years
on the relation between such focusing events and political agenda-
setting. Focusing events can be viewed as a key to opening the door to
new policy—they highlight policy failures and provide opportunities for
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“solving” existing problems. Following the attacks of September 11th, 
attention was focused on “a range of issues related to the attacks, claims 
[were] m ade that policies designed to prevent or m itigate such attacks 
have failed, and new policies [em erged] to address the problems 
revealed by the a tta ck ” (Birkland, 2004, p. 179). The September 11th 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are clearly focusing 
events. Birkland states that the September 11th attacks "were a substantial 
focusing event that continues to reverberate through Am erican politics 
today, and will likely do so for some tim e” (p. 196).
The most prominent exam ple of questionable post-September 11th 
policy, the USA PATRIOT ACT, was form ed in response to the 2001 terrorist 
attacks against the United States, and dram atically expanded the 
authority of U.S. law enforcem ent for the stated purpose of fighting 
terrorist acts in the United States and abroad (USA PATRIOT ACT, H.R. 3162, 
Public Law No: 107-56). Although the A ct passed in the im m ediate 
afterm ath of the September 11 attacks, interestingly, and disturbingly, the 
docum ent was written long before those attacks ever took p lace. The A ct 
sped through Congress with remarkably little dissent.
Although a number of its provisions are not controversial, the USA 
PATRIOT Act nevertheless stands out as revolutionary in its design. To an 
unprecedented degree, the A ct sacrifices the political freedoms of the 
American people in the name of national security, while upsetting the
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dem ocratic values that define our nation by consolidating 
considerable new powers in the executive branch of governm ent. The 
USA PATRIOT ACT “encompasses much of the conservative law 
enforcem ent com m unity’s preexisting desires for more aggressive law 
enforcem ent tools” (Birkland, 2004, p. 187), and infringes on basic 
freedoms and privacy of the Am erican people. The sense is that the 
administration is using the war on terrorism to accom plish long-held policy 
goals (Birkland, 2004, p. 187). Despite this, the ACT passed with little 
question from the public. One may ask how this could be—the answer: 
FEAR.
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CHAPTER 2 
R e s e a rc h  Q u e s tio n s
This study will address the relation between the mass m edia and the 
so-called “culture of fear” as it pertains to the trust or con fidence  of the 
population in each branch of the federal government. It is im portant to 
note that although the scope of this study is not expansive enough to 
determ ine a causal mechanism for the developm ent of the attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviors exhibited by television audiences, the ramifications 
of any significant relation that may em erge between heavy television 
exposure, peoples’ levels of fear and confidence in the governm ent are 
certainly worth investigation.
M e th o d
Due to certain unavoidable time constraints, the creation of an 
original da ta  set through the collection of primary da ta  was not possible 
for this research. As a result, an existing da ta  set was chosen to facilita te 
this research. The General Social Survey (GSS) da ta  used in this study were 
co llected by The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) using a 
sample fram e based on Census da ta  in 2004, block quota sampling in 
1972-1974 and for half of the 1975 and 1976 surveys, and full probability 
sampling of all non-institutionalized English-speaking persons 18 years of 
age or older living in the United States in 1977, 1978,1980,1982-1991,1993-
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1994,1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, and half of the surveys conducted  in 1975 
and 1976. The version of the 1972-2004 Cumulative General Social Surveys 
used in this study has been w eighted to adjust for the purposive over- 
sampling of the Black subpopulation in 1982 and 1987 and for the sub- 
sampling design used in 2004, accord ing  to the NORC. The surveys were 
conducted  via face -to -face  interviews and computer-assisted personal 
interviews. This particular da ta  set was chosen due to its large population 
size, the specific variables availab le that were pertinent to this research 
(outlined below), and for the relative ease with which the da ta  cou ld  be 
analyzed quantitatively. This da ta  set is w idely available to the general 
public and contains da ta  from respondents nationwide.
P a r t ic ip a n t s
The participants in this study were respondents to the General Social 
Survey Series (GSS) conducted  by the National Opinion Research Center 
and sponsored by the National Science Foundation between 1996 and 
2004 (a subset of the aggrega te  GSS da ta  available from 1972-2004). The 
sample consisted o f 46,345 respondents. Respondents were chosen from 
all non-institutionalized English-speaking persons 18 years of age  or older, 
living in the United States. Due to the nature of the da ta  itself and the 
proposed use of this da ta , this study poses very little risk to the human 
subjects involved. This research presents a reasonable opportunity to
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further the understanding of the effects of television m edia on the 
general public.
D e s ig n
A relevant subset of the secondary da ta  (GSS) obta ined through 
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 
has been created for the purposes of this study. Included in the subset of 
the da ta  are dem ographic items of age, sex and educafion, ifems 
pertaining to respondents’ level of confidence in each branch of the 
governm ent (i.e. executive, judicia l and legislative), the number of hours 
of television respondents consume in a given day and variables that 
accoun t for the respondent levels of fear in different situations, as 
described below. Using da ta  regarding time spent w atch ing television, a 
quantitative analysis was conducted  in order to determ ine if a relation 
exists betw een the am ount of television respondents’ w a tch  and their 
levels of fear and confidence in each branch of the federal governm ent 
in acco rdance  with Gerbner’s theory of cultivation.
Because this study uses pre-existing data , the research is bound by 
the existing variables to a certain degree. This limitation is inherent in the 
use of secondary da ta , however, as previously noted, the use of primary 
da ta  was not possible for this research. It is the limitation of existing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
variables com bined with the fundam ental theories upon which 
cultivation research is based that shaped the hypotheses set forth in this 
research.
Variables regarding con fidence  in the governm ent refer to the 
federal governm ent and da ta  was categorized by branch of governm ent 
(i.e., executive, judicial, legislative). Variables with da ta  pertaining to an 
overall level of fear were not availab le in the existing d a ta  set. Because of 
fhis, broad variables thaf relafe to several different types o f fear were 
chosen from the existing variables in the da ta  set. Specifically, da ta  
regarding whether or not the respondent feels unsafe walking in their 
neighborhood a t night is examined. Data pertaining to the likelihood (in 
the respondents’ opinion) tha t the United States will be involved in 
another world w ar in the next ten years is explored. Finally, da ta  regarding 
whether the respondent believes that as a general rule, most people can 
be trusted, or that one cannot be too careful when it comes to trusting 
other peop le  is examined.
Using the aforem entioned variables that pertain to fear in 
conjunction with variables regarding respondents’ confidence in each 
branch of the government, the following hypotheses will be considered:
H I: Greater exposure to television will lead to a greater 
level of fear of walking in the neighborhood at 
night.
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H2: Greater exposure to television will lead to a
greater belief that the United States will engage in 
another world war in the next ten years.
H3: Greater exposure to television will lead to a lack of 
trust in other people.
H4: Respondents exhibiting greater levels of fear of 
walking in the neighborhood at night will have a 
greater level of confidence  in the government.
H5: Respondents exhibiting a greater belief that the 
United States will be involved in a world war in the 
next ten years will exhibit a greater level of 
confidence in the government.
H6: Respondents exhibiting lower levels of trust in other 
people will demonstrate a lower level of 
con fidence  in the government.
H7: Those respondents classified as “o lder” will exhibit a 
greater level of confidence in the governm ent than 
will those respondents classified as “younger.”
H8: Female respondents will exhibit a greater level of 
con fidence  in the governm ent than will male 
respondents.
H9: Respondents classified as “ less ed u ca te d ” will 
exhibit a greater level of confidence in the 
governm ent than will those respondents classified 
as “ more e d u ca ted .”
Using the fundam enta l hypothesis of cultivation theory (i.e., heavy 
viewers of television are more likely to believe that the world is a “ m ean 
and scary” p lace), this study proposes to determ ine w hat relation, if any, 
exists between the cultivation of fear in television audiences and their 
confidence in each branch of the United States government.
Pr o c e d u r e
For the purposes of this study, da ta  was examined to determ ine the 
extent to which television influences respondents’ level of fear, if a t all.
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and the implications of this relation on respondents’ level of confidence 
in the government. As it pertains to confidence, a score of fhree (3) 
represents a great deal of confidence in the government, a score of two 
(2) represents only some confidence in the government, while a score of 
one (1) indicates very little con fidence  in the governm ent for the 
executive, judicia l and legislative branches.
In regards to whether or not respondents felt afraid to walk in their 
neighborhood at night, a score of one (1) indicates tha t the respondent is 
not afraid, while a score o f two (2) indicates that they are afraid to walk in 
the neighborhood at night.
In reference to whether or not the respondent believes that the 
United States will be involved in another world war in the next ten years, a 
score of one (1) indicates tha t the respondent does not believe that the 
United States will be involved in a world war, while a score of two (2) 
indicates that the respondent does believe that the United States will be 
involved in a world war in the next ten years.
As it pertains to trust in other people, a score of one (1) indicates 
that the respondent feels that they canno t be too careful when it comes 
to trusting other people, while a score of two (2) indicates that the 
respondent feels that whether or not they can  trust another person 
“depends” on some other fac to r and a score of three (3) indicates that 
the respondent feels that most people  can  be trusted.




The results ind icate that the m ean number of hours respondents 
viewed television per day was 3.06 with a standard deviation o f 3.827 and 
that 30.1% of respondents are considered to be “ heavy viewers” 
accord ing  to Gerbner’s theory of cultivation (i.e. view four or more hours 
of television per day). Socio-dem ographic characteristics of the sample 
indicate that 43.9% are male; the m ean age is 45.27 with a standard 
deviation of 17.486; 43.3% are edu ca ted  beyond the high school level.
H ypotheses  1.2. & 3
Zero-order correlations revealed a statistically significant relation 
between the number of hours of television viewed and respondents’ fear 
of walking in their neighborhood at night (r = .06, p  < .001). This indicates 
that the more hours of television respondents w atched, the more fearful 
they were in their neighborhood at night. Further, a significant negative 
relation (r = -.026, p=.025) betw een the am ount of time spent watch ing 
television and the level of con fidence  in the executive branch of the 
governm ent was found. In other words, the more television respondents 
w atched, the less confident they were in the executive branch of the 
government. Further, a significant negative relation (r = -.024, p=.037) 
between the am ount of time spent w atch ing  television and the level of
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confidence in the judicial branch of the governm ent was found. In 
other words, the more television respondents w atched, the less confident 
they were in the judicial branch of the government. However, there was 
no significant relation (r = -.010, p=.233) between the am ount of time 
spent w atch ing television and the level of confidence in the legislative 
branch of the government.
Zero-order correlations revealed a statistically significant relation 
between the am ount of television viewed per day and respondents' 
belief that the United States would be involved in a world w ar within the 
next ten years (r = .050, p  < .001). This indicates that the higher the number 
of hours of television respondents w a tched , the more likely they were to 
believe that the United States would be involved in a world w ar in the next 
ten years. Further, there was no significant relation (r = -.012, p=.137) 
between the am ount of time spent w atch ing television and the level of 
confidence in the executive branch of the government.
In addition, a significant negative relation (r = -.023, p=.020) 
between the am ount of time spent w atch ing television and the level of 
confidence in the judicia l branch of the governm ent was found. In other 
words, the more television respondents w atched, the less confident they 
were in the judicial branch of the government. However, no significant 
relation exists (r = -.003, p=.379) between the am ount of time spent
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watch ing television and the level of confidence in the legislative 
branch of the government.
Zero-order correlations revealed a statistically significant relation 
between the number of hours of television viewed per day and 
respondents’ belief that other people  can be trusted (r = -.072, p<.001). In 
other words, the more hours of television respondents consumed, the less 
likely they were to believe that other people  can be trusted. No 
significant relation exists (r = -.012, p=.078) between the am ount of time 
spent w atch ing television and the level of confidence in the executive 
branch of the government, although it does approach  significance.
Further, a significant negative relation (r = -.024, p<.05) betw een the 
am ount of fime spent w atch ing television and the level of con fidence  in 
fhe judicial branch of the governm ent was found. In other words, the 
more television respondents w atched, the less confident they were in the 
judicial branch of the government. However, no significant relation exists 
(r = -.005, p=.275) between the am ount of time spent w atch ing television 
and the level of confidence in the legislative branch of the government, 
although it does approach  significance.
H ypothesis  4
To test whether number of hours of television viewed per day and 
fear of walking a t night in neighborhood predicted confidence in each
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branch of the governm ent (i.e., executive, judicial, and legislative), 
separate hierarchical regression analyses were performed in which 
number of hours of television viewed per day was entered in Step 1 and 
fear of walking in the neighborhood a t night was entered in Step 2. With 
regard to confidence in the executive branch, both steps were 
statistically significant (F( 1, 5605) = 3.81; p  < .05 and F[2, 5605) = 8.211; p  < 
.001; respectively). In Step 1, number of television hours per day was a 
significant predictor of con fidence  in the executive branch (0 = -.026, p< 
.05). In Step 2, when fear o f walking in neighborhood was entered, the 
am ount of television one w a tched  no longer significantly pred icted  their 
level of confidence in the executive branch of the governm ent (|3 = -.023, 
p=.081); however, fear of walking in neighborhood was statistically 
significant (/3 = -.047, p<.001), suggesting that fear of walking fully 
mediates the e ffect of television viewing on confidence in the executive 
branch, and that the more fear one has of walking in their neighborhood 
a t night, the less confidence one has in the executive branch.
Table 1
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Executive 
Branch
Variable B S E B P R2A t
Step 1 
TV hours per day -.006 .003 -.026 -1.952*
Step 2 
TV hours per day -.005 -.003 -.023
.002
-1.744
Fear of walking at night -.065 .018 -.047 -3.550***
Overall R2=.003
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
With regard to  con fidence  in the judicia l branch of government, 
Step 1 was not statistically significant, however Step 2 d id reach statistical 
significance (F(l, 5528) = 3.177; p  < .075 and F(2, 5528) = 13.040; p < .001; 
respectively). In Step 1, number of television hours per day was not a 
significant predictor of confidence in the judicial branch (/3 = -.024, p< 
.075). As we would expect, in Step 2, when fear of walking in 
neighborhood was entered, the am ount of television one w a tched  still 
was not a significant predictor of respondents’ level of confidence in the 
judicial branch of the governm ent {/3 = -.020, p=. 134); however, fear of 
walking in neighborhood was statistically significant (/3 = -.064, p<.001), 
suggesting that when controlling for number of hours w atch ing television, 
fear of walking is a significant predictor of respondents’ level of 
confidence in fhe judicia l branch. In other words, the more fearful one is 
of walking in their neighborhood a t night, the less confidence they have in 
the judicia l branch of government.
Ta b l e  2
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Judicial
Branch
Variable 8 S E B & R2A t
Step 1
TV hours per day -.005 .003 -.024 -1.782
Step 2 
TV hours per day -.004 .003 -.020
.004
-1.498
Fear of walking at night -.086 .018 -.064 -4.784***
Overall R2=. 005
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
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Finally, with regard to the legislative branch of government, neither 
Step 1 nor Step 2 were statistically significant (F(l, 5617) = .534; p=.465 and 
F(2, 5617) = .271; p  =.763; respectively). In Step 1, number of television 
hours per day was not a significant predictor of confidence in the 
legislative branch (jS = -.010, p=.465). As expected in Step 2, when fear of 
walking in neighborhood was entered, the am ount of television one 
w a tched  still d id not influenced their level of confidence in the legislative 
branch of the governm ent (0 = -.010, p=.469); fear o f walking in 
neighborhood was also not statistically significant (j3 = -.001, p=.927). This 
suggests that confidence in the legislative branch is not pred icted by 
respondents’ television viewing habits or by their fear of walking in the 
neighborhood at night.
Ta b l e  3
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicfing Confidence in the Legislative
Branch
Variable B S E B & R2A t
Step 1
TV hours per day -.002 .003 -.010 -.731
Step 2 
TV hours per day -.002 .003 -.010
.000
-.724
Fear of walking at night -.002 .017 -.001 -.092
Overall R2=.000
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
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H ypo thesis  5
To test whether greater exposure to television and greater belief 
that the United States will engage in another world war in the next ten 
years predicted confidence in the three branches of governm ent (i.e.. 
executive, judicial and legislative), separate hierarchical regression 
analyses were performed, in which television hours viewed per day was 
entered in Step 1 and respondents’ belief that the United States will be 
involved in a world war within the next ten years was entered in Step 2.
With regard to the executive branch of government, Step 1 was not 
statistically significant (F( 1, 8042) = 1.194; p =.275), however Step 2 was 
statistically significant (F(2, 8042) = 38.821; p  < .001). In Step 1, number of 
television hours per day was not a significant predictor of con fidence  in 
the executive branch (|3 = -.012, p=.275). As expected in Step 2, when 
belief that the United States would be involved in a world w ar within the 
next ten years was entered, the am ount of television still d id not predict 
their level of confidence in the executive branch of the governm ent ()3 =  - 
.007, p=.510); however, belief that the United States would be involved in 
a world war was statistically significant (0 = -.097, p<.001). This suggests 
that confidence in the executive branch is not pred icted by respondents’ 
television viewing habits, but is pred icted by respondents’ belief that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
United States will be involved in a world war within the next ten years, 
after controlling for am ount of television viewed. Specifically, the more 
respondents believed that the United States will be involved in a world 
war, the less confident they were in the executive branch of government.
Ta b l e  4
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Executive
Branch
Variable B S E B R2A T
Step 1
TV hours per day -.002 .002 -.012 -1.093
Step 2
TV hours per day -.001 .002 -.007
.009
-.658
US in WWIII within 10 years -.131 .015 -.097 -8.743***
Overall R2=.010
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
With regard to the judicia l branch, both steps were statistically
significant (F (1, 7957} = 4.207; p < .05 and F (2, 7957) = 87.149; p < .001; 
respectively). In Step 1, number of felevision hours per day was a 
significant predictor of confidence in the judicial branch (0 = -.023, p< 
.05), with the more hours spent w atch ing television the less confidence in 
the judicia l branch. In Step 2, when belief that the United States will be 
involved in a world w ar was entered, the am ount of television one 
w a tched  no longer influenced their level of confidence in the judicial 
branch of the governm ent (0 = -.015, p=. 164); however, belief that the 
United States will be involved in a world war within the next ten years was 
statistically significant (0 = -.145, p<.001), suggesting that belief that the 
United States will be involved in a world war fully mediates the e ffect of
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television viewing on confidence in the judicial branch and the more 
one believes that the United States will be involved in a world war, the less 
confident they are in the judicia l branch.
Ta b l e  5
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Judicial
Branch
Variable B S E B R2A t
Step 1





TV hours per day -.003 .002 -.015 -1.391
US in WWIII within 10 years 
Overall R2=.021
-.191 .015 -.145 -13.038***
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
Finally, with regard to the legislative branch Step 1 was not 
statistically significant, however Step 2 d id reach statistical significance (F 
(1, 8056) = .096; p  = .757 and F (2,8056) = 8.600; p < .001; respectively). In 
Step 1, number of television hours per day was not a significant predictor 
of confidence in the legislative branch (/3 = -.003, p= .757). As w e would 
expect, in Step 2, when belief that the United States will be involved in a 
world war was entered, the am ount of television one w a tched  still d id not 
significantly predict respondents’ level of confidence in fhe legislative 
branch of the governm ent (j3 = -.001, p=.914); however, belief that the 
United States will be involved in a world war was statistically significant (0 = 
-.046, p<.001), suggesting that belief that the United States will be involved 
in a world war predicts respondents' level of confidence in fhe legislative 
branch when controlling for number of hours viewing television per day.
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The more one believes that the United States will be involved in a world 
war the less confident they are in the legislative branch of government.
Ta b l e  6
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Legislative
Branch
Variable B S E B 13 R2A t
Step 1 
TV hours per day -.001 .002 -.003 -.309
Step 2 
TV hours per day .000 .002 -.001
.002
-.108
US in WWIII within 10 years -.058 .014 .046 -4.136***
Overall R2=002
***p< 000; **p<.01; *p<.05
Hypothesis 6
To test whether greater exposure to television and lack of trust in 
other peop le  pred icted  confidence  in each branch of government, 
separate hierarchical regression analyses were performed, in which 
number of hours of television viewed per day was entered in Step 1 and 
belief that other people can  be trusted was entered in Step 2.
With regard to the executive branch of governmenf, Step 1 was not 
statistically significant, however Step 2 did reach statistical significance (F 
(1, 14443) =2.016; p  = .156 and F (2, 14443) = 51.209; p < .001; 
respectively). In Step 1, number of television hours per day was not a 
significant predictor of con fidence  in the executive branch (jB = -.012, p- 
.156). As we would expect, in Step 2, when belief that other people can 
be trusted was entered, the am ount o f television one w a tched  still d id not
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predict respondents’ level of confidence  in the executive branch of the 
governm ent (j8 = -.006, p=.487); however, belief that other people can be 
trusted was statistically significant (/3 = .083, p<.001), suggesting that the 
even when controlling for the number of hours viewing television, belief 
that other people  can  be trusted predicts respondents’ level of 
confidence  in the executive branch. In other words, respondents who 
believe that other people can be trusted tend to have a higher level of 
confidence in the executive branch of the government.
Ta b l e  7
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in fhe Executive
Branch
Variable B S E B B R2A t
Step 1
TV hours per day -.002 .001 -.012 .156
Step 2
TV hours per day -.001 .001 -.006
.007
-.696
Trust others .058 .006 .083 10.019***
Overall R2=.007
* * * p <  goo; **p<.01; *p<.05
With regard to the judicia l branch of government, both steps were 
statistically significant (F (1, 14243) = 8.299; p  < .05 and F (2, 14243) =
112.780; p  < .001; respectively). In Step 1, number of television hours per 
day was a significant predictor of confidence  in the judicial branch f/3 = - 
.024, p< .05). In Step 2, when belief that other people can be trusted was 
entered, the am ount of television one w a tched  no longer predicted their 
level of confidence in the judicial branch of the governm ent (j8 = -.015, 
p=.077); however, belief that other people  can  be trusted was statistically
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significant (0 = .123, pc.OOl), suggesting tha t belief that other people 
can be trusted fully mediates the e ffec t of television viewing on 
confidence in the judicial branch. Specifically, respondents who believe 
that other people  can  be trusted are likely to have more con fidence  in 
the judicia l branch of the government.
Table  8
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Judicial
Branch
Variable B S E B P R2A t
Step 1 
TV hours per day -.005 .002 -.024 .004**
Step 2
TV hours per day -.003 .002 -.015
.015
-1.767
Trust others .086 .006 .123 14.736***
Overall R2=015
***p< 000; **p<.0l; *p<.05
With regard to the legislative branch of government, Step 1 was 
not statistically significant, however Step 2 did reach statistical 
significance (F (1, 14445) = .359; p  = .549 and F (2, 14445) = 9.425; p  < .001; 
respectively). In Step 1, number o f television hours per day was not a 
significant predictor of confidence  in the legislative branch (0 = -.005, p= 
.549). As we w ould expect, in Step 2, when belief that other people can  
be trusted was entered, the am ount of television one w a tched  still d id not 
predict respondents’ level of con fidence  in the legislative branch of the 
governm ent (0 = -.002, p=.784); however, belief that other people  can  be 
trusted was statistically significant (0 = .036, p<.001), suggesting that the 
belief that other people  can  be trusted predicts respondents’ level of
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confidence in the legislative branch when controlling for number of 
television hours viewed per day. In other words, respondents who believe 
that other people  can be trusted tend to have a higher level of 
confidence in the legislative branch of the government.
Ta b l e  9
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Confidence in the Legislative
Branch
Variable B S E B P R2A t
Step 1
TV hours per day -.001 .001 -.005 -.599
Step 2 .001
TV hours per day .000 .001 -.002 -.274
Trust others .023 .005 .036 4.300***
Overall R2=.001
***p<.000; **p<.01; *p<.05
H ypo thesis  7
To test the hypothesis tha t o lder respondents will exhibit a greater 
level of confidence in the governm ent than younger respondents, zero- 
order correlations were perform ed for each of the branches of 
government (executive, judicia l and legislative). Results suggested that 
the older the respondent, the more likely they were to exhibit a high level 
of confidence in the executive branch of the governm ent (r=.019, 
pc.OOt), as hypothesized. However, it was also revealed tha t the older the 
respondent, the less likely they were to exhibit a higher level of 
confidence in the judicia l (r=-.053, p<.001) and legislative (r=-.017, p=.001) 
branches of the government, contrary to  the hypothesis.
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H ypothesis  8
To test the hypothesis that fem ale respondents will exhibit a greater 
level of confidence in the governm ent than will male respondents, an 
independent t-test was performed for each  o f fhe branches of 
governm ent (i.e. executive, judicia l and legislative). Independent t-tests 
revealed that female respondents had more confidence than males in 
the legislative branches of the governm ent but not in the executive 
branch (f(29,261.39) = -5.851; pc.OOland f(29,566.66) = -.614; p<.539, 
respectively). However, with regard to the judicial branch and contrary to 
w hat was hypothesized, males had more confidence than females 
(f(28,984.31) = 5.13; p<.001). Refer to  Table 10 for sample sizes, means and 
standard deviations for con fidence  levels by sex.
Table 10
Confidence in Executive 
Branch




Female 1.8769 2.1644“ 1.8875b
(0.66061) (.64459) (.60354)
N=17616 N=17254 N=17588
Male 1.8722 2.2035° 1.846b
(.69189) (.69010) (.64629)
N=14095 N=13977 N=14108
Note: Means sharing superscript significantly differ.
H ypo thesis  9
To test the hypothesis that respondents with a high school 
education or less will have greater con fidence  in the governm ent than will 
those respondents with greater than a high school education, an
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independent t-test was performed for each of the branches of 
governm ent (i.e. executive, judicia l and legislative). The independent t- 
test revealed that those respondents with greater than a high school 
education were more confident in the executive and judicia l branches of 
governm ent than those with a high school education or less, (t(28,750.952) 
= -.654; p<.008 and f (29,276.98) = -19.503; pc.OOl, respectively), contrary to 
the hypothesis. The independent t-test revealed that, as hypothesized, the 
respondents with a high school education or less had more con fidence  in 
the legislative branch of the governm ent than those with greater than a 
high school education (f(29,470.42) = 5.277; p<.001). Refer to Table 11 for 
sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for confidence  levels by 
education.
Table 11
Confidence in Executive 
Branch





School 1.8657° 2.1197b 1.8847°
Educatio
n (0.67434) (.67449) (.63477)
N=18289 N=17882 N=18265
> High 
School 1.8861° 2.2665b 1.8475°
Educatio
n (.67422) (.64371) (.60635)
N=13343 N=13270 N=13347
Note: Means sharing superscript significantly differ.
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CHAPTER 4
D is c u s s io n
This study reveals a number of insights into cultivation theory as it 
may pertain to the relation between television viewing, fear and 
confidence in the United States government. Although many of these 
findings are statistically significant, the strength of the findings is minimal. In 
nearly every hierarchical regression analysis, the proportion of variance 
accoun ted  for is quite low. The smallness of cultivation correlations found 
in this study is consistent with previous research.
One of the primary limitations of this study is that the type of 
program that the respondent is viewing is unknown. There is a great deal 
of variety in television programming, and respondents may be partial to 
one type of programm ing over another. Because of this, some 
respondents may exhibit greater levels of fear due to their programm ing 
preferences (for example, if they w a fched  largely crime dram a and 
television news), than others who may exhibit very low levels of fear due to 
their programm ing preferences (for example, if they were partial to Home 
& Garden Television or the Food Network). Because there is no w ay of 
determining w hat type of programs the respondent is viewing, utilizing 
television hours w a tched  as a variable becomes problem atic. Gerbner’s 
theory of cultivation pred icted  that all television viewing would lead to an 
increase in fear. Though Gerbner’s theory of cultivation focuses on m edia
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consumption in terms of hours, Potter and Chang (1999) determ ined 
that the most successful independent variable for measuring the 
cultivation effects of television viewing is a content analysis (in other 
words, an analysis of the specific fype of television programming viewed 
in relation to the to ta l television consumption by respondents). Such 
content analysis may reveal that program  type mediates the e ffec t of 
cultivation theory’s "M ean World Syndrome.”
Also, examining television as the primary source of information (as 
cultivation theory suggests) implies that only television influences 
respondents. Surely this is not the case -  respondents shape their 
perceptions of reality from a number of sources, such as newspapers, film 
and /o r personal experiences. Beyond that, there may be limitations in the 
external validity of this study with regards to the sample population. One 
must wonder how representative is the sample of adults living throughout 
the United States.
In addition, while the questionnaires used in the General Social 
Surveys are suitable for testing the hypotheses set forth in this study, the 
questionnaire was not specifically designed for cultivation research or the 
particular hypotheses presented here. Using secondary da ta  not 
specifically designed for this study presents limitations such as those 
outlined above that were unable to be dealt with in this study.
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Despite these limitations, there are several interesting results 
regarding fear and confidence in the government. The results of this study 
are largely consistent with previous research findings and although small, 
may have a significant im pact on society as a whole. Critics of cultivation 
research cite these relatively small correlations as evidence of the 
inherent weakness of the theory itself (Hirsch, 1980; Potter & Chang, 1990). 
However, G erbnere t al. (1990) de fend these minimal findings by 
describing how even the smallest of effects can have very significant 
repercussions -  that as long as there exists a slight positive correlation, 
evidence exists tha t cultivation is indeed taking p lace and tha t television 
has a potentially tremendous e ffect on society as a whole.
With regard to the hypothesis that greater exposure to television will 
lead to a greater level of fear of walking in the neighborhood a t night, the 
results ind icate that for the sample in question, this is indeed the case. This 
is consistent with previous cultivation research that indicates that heavy 
television viewers will exhibit greater levels of fear (Gerbner, 1976;
Glassner, 1999; Dowler, 2003; Schlesinger, Tumber & Murdock, 1991). 
Gerbner asserts that heavy viewers of television will express a greater level 
of apprehension, mistrust and perceptions of living in a dangerous world 
than light viewers (Gerbner, 1994). This aspect of cultivation theory 
provides explanation as to why respondents in this study who experience
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exposure to television will exhibit a greater level of fear of walking in fhe 
neighborhood af nighf.
With regard to the hypothesis that greater exposure to television will 
lead to a greater belief that the United States will engage in another 
world war in the next ten years, the results ind icate that as hypothesized, 
the more hours of felevision respondents w atched, the greater their belief 
that the United States would be involved in a world w ar within the next ten 
years. Gerbner’s {T994} assertion once again provides some explanation 
as to why heavy viewers in this sample population would be more likely 
than light viewers to believe that the United States will be involved in a 
world war within the next ten years. If fhrough television media, 
respondents are indeed being “cu ltiva ted” to believe that the world is a 
mean and scary place, it is not surprising that respondents who consume 
large amounts of television m edia w ould be more inclined to fear an 
imminent world war.
When w e examine the results as they pertain to hypothesis that 
greater exposure to television will lead to a lack of trust in other people, 
we find that as hypothesized, the more hours of television respondents 
consumed, the less likely they were to believe that other people  can be 
trusted. This is consistent with previous research that revealed a strong 
correlation between heavy television viewing and a general mistrust of 
other people (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan & Signorielli, 1980).
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With regard to the hypothesis that respondents exhibiting greater 
levels of fear of walking in the neighborhood at night will have a greater 
level of confidence in the government, we experience mixed results. In 
terms of the executive branch, respondents’ fear of walking in the 
neighborhood at night fully mediates the significant e ffect of television 
viewing on confidence in the government. However, the results ind icate 
that respondents who are more fearful of walking in their neighborhood at 
night exhibit a significantly lower level of confidence in the executive 
branch. Similar results were found for the judicial branch, although 
television viewing did not have any significant e ffect on confidence.
Once again, contrary to the hypothesis, respondents who are more fearful 
of walking in their neighborhood at night exhibited a significantly lower of 
confidence in the judicia l branch. Respondents' confidence in the 
legislative branch was not significantly a ffec ted  by their fear of walking in 
their neighborhood a t night, even when controlling for number of 
television hours viewed.
When we examine the results as they pertain to the hypothesis that 
respondents exhibiting a greater belief that the United States will be 
involved in a world war in the next ten years will exhibit a greater level of 
confidence in the government, w e again experience mixed results. While 
respondents' confidence in the executive branch was not significantly 
a ffec ted  by television viewing, it was a ffec ted  by the respondents’ belief
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that the United States would be involved in a world war within the next 
ten years. Contrary to the hypothesis, those respondents exhibiting a 
greater belief that the United States would be involved in a world war 
were more likely to have a significantly lower level of confidence  in the 
executive branch. Likewise, while respondents’ confidence in the 
legislative branch was not significantly a ffec ted  by television viewing, their 
belief that the United States would be involved in a world w ar was 
significantly related to a lower level of confidence in the legislative 
branch. Further, television viewing was a significant predictor of 
confidence in the judicia l branch of the governm ent -  the greater the 
am ount of television respondents w a tched , the less confident they were 
in the judicial branch. Respondents’ belief that the United States would be 
involved in a world war fully m ediated this effect, suggesting that 
respondents’ belief that the United States would be involved in a world 
war was a predictor of their level of confidence in the judicia l branch. 
Specifically and contrary to  the hypothesis, respondents with a greater 
belief that the United States would be involved in a world war in the next 
ten years exhibited a significantly lower level of confidence in the judicial 
branch of government.
With regard to the hypothesis that respondents exhibiting lower 
levels of trust in other people will demonstrate a lower level of confidence 
in the government, the results ind icate that, as hypothesized, respondents
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who felt that others could be trusted had a higher level of confidence 
in all branches of the governm ent than those who felt that others could 
not be trusted. These findings of course, stand to reason -  respondents 
who are less likely to trust other people should be expected to have a 
lower degree of confidence in a governm ent comprised of the very 
people they believe cannot be trusted.
When w e examine the results as they pertain to hypothesis that 
respondents classified as “ o lder” will exhibit a greater level of confidence 
in the governm ent than will those respondents classified as “younger,” we 
see that as hypothesized, the older the respondent, the more likely they 
were to exhibit a higher level of confidence in the executive branch of 
fhe governm ent. However, contrary to hypothesis, older respondents were 
less likely to exhibit higher levels of confidence in fhe judicial and 
legislative branches of government. Accord ing to past research, we 
should expect that confidence in the governm ent would increase with 
age, as the results of this study ind icate  for the executive branch of 
government. In a 2005 study on trust in the government, Christensen and 
Laegreid found that age has significant e ffect, whereby older people 
generally have more trust in governm ental institutions than younger 
people. They attributed this difference to the idea that older people have 
experienced the developm ent of the welfare state and will therefore tend 
to have more trust in governm ent than younger people who have
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experienced a heavy reliance on the private sector (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2005). As to the inconsistent results for the judicia l and legislative 
branch, it is possible that the sample used in this study is not representative 
of the population of interest with regards to this hypothesis and past 
literature.
In regards to the hypothesis tha t fem ale respondents will exhibit a 
greater level of confidence in the governm ent than will male 
respondents, the results ind icate that as hypothesized, females were more 
likely to exhibit a higher level of con fidence  in the executive and 
legislative branches of government. However, contrary to hypothesis, 
females were less likely to exhibit a higher level of confidence in the 
judicia l branch of governm ent than were males. When examining the link 
between fear and confidence in the government, the significant findings 
for the executive and legislative branches are very im portant. Past 
literature suggests tha t the trait most consistently linked to fear, especially 
fear o f crime is being fem ale (Ferraro & Lagrange, 1992; Warr, 1984; 
Chicoros, et al., 1997). Cultivation studies have consistently shown that 
females are significantly more fearful than males (Peck, 1999). When we 
observe the results in light of past literature on cultivation gender 
differences, it should com e as no great surprise that wom en tend to have 
more confidence  in the governm ent than do males, as the da ta  suggests 
(for the executive and legislative branches). The inconsistent finding for
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confidence in the judicia l branch is quite puzzling -  one possible 
explanation for this finding could be that females are more likely to  fear 
becom ing a victim  of crime than males (Ragsdale, 2003) — if one is afraid 
of victimization, they m ay p lace  less confidence in the effectiveness of 
the institutions that are supposed to pro tect them, for example, the 
criminal justice system. Another explanation is the proximal nature of the 
judicial branch when com pared  with the other branches of government.
It could be that respondents are more likely to have had d irect personal 
experience with the judicia l branch than with the executive or legislative 
branches. If that is the case, the sample population may have an 
overrepresentation o f respondents who have had a negative experience 
with the jud icia l branch of government. Further research is required to 
determ ine w hat possible variables may accoun t for this inconsistent 
finding for the judicia l branch.
When we examine the results in regards to the hypothesis that 
respondents classified as “ less e d u ca te d ” will exhibit a greater level of 
confidence in the governm ent than will those respondents classified as 
“ more educa ted ," the results ind icate that contrary to hypothesis, those 
respondents w ho had less than a high school education exhibited less 
confidence in the executive and judicia l branches of governm ent than 
those respondents with a greater education  level. However, as 
hypothesized, those respondents who were “ less e d u ca te d ” exhibited a
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higher level of confidence in the legislative branch of government. The 
findings for the executive and judicia l branch are perplexing indeed. They 
refute the findings of previous literature that ind icate tha t the less 
educa ted  have more confidence  in the leaders of the three branches of 
governm ent (Cook & Gronke, 2004) as hypothesized, and as w e  found for 
the legislative branch of governm ent in this study. A possible explanation 
for this inconsistent finding is tha t the sample in this study, due to the 
nature of using pre-existing da ta , was not representative of the population 
of interest with regards to this hypothesis.
As to how the aforem entioned hypotheses relate to a culture of 
fear, we can see tha t even when examining variables pertaining to 
specific fears such as walking in the neighborhood a t night, belief o f an 
imminent world war, or the inability to trust others, we see that television 
has a significant cultivating effect. This research indicates that there is 
evidence that exposure to television is significantly related to an increase 
in fear am ong the population in question, consistent with Gerbner’s 
cultivation theory.
It is im portant to note tha t correlation does not equate to 
causation. A great number of variables need to be examined through 
further research to determ ine whether heavy exposure to television is the 
actua l cause, or perhaps one of m any causes of fear in television 
audiences. While it is the position of this research that television exposure
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leads to a heightened sense of fear, the possibility does exist that 
increased fear leads one to stay a t home and be exposed to a greater 
am ount of television. Further, it is the position of this research, and of past 
cultivation research, that television exposure leads to an exaggera ted 
level of fear. However, due to the nature of this research, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that television provides audiences with a more accura te  
representation of how  “ m ean and scary” the world actua lly is.
While the present study indicates tha t an increased level of fear 
leads to a decreased level of confidence  in the federal government, 
contrary to the hypotheses set forth in this research, there are still concerns 
that the governm ent and m edia m ay be able to m anipulate populations 
through an increased level of fear. G erbner’s Theory of Cultivation 
proposes that television w atch ing  over a period of m any years m ay lead 
the viewer to establish certain television-based beliefs. These beliefs, 
accord ing to cultivation research and the present study, correspond to a 
heightened level of fear. This sense of fear can be (and has been) used 
by politicians to justify centralization of authority, strip aw ay citizens’ rights, 
increase surveillance, and call for still broader governm ent powers 
(Barnet, 1996). Based on the results of this study, com bined with past 
literature and recent events, it is proposed that these cultivation effects 
may be both im m ediate and short-term, especially in the im m ediate 
afterm ath of a focusing event.
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Despite the fac t that many of the hypotheses set forth in the 
present study ind ica ted that an increased levef of fear leads to a 
decreased level of confidence in the federal government, there is 
evidence nonetheless that increased fear has a significant e ffec t on 
confidence in the government. Past da ta  reveals that public confidence 
in the governm ent soars in the face  of international crises (Sigelman & 
Conover, 1981). This effect, dubbed  a “ rally e ffec t” by Sigelman and 
Conover in 1981, may be further fueled by the ensuing m edia coverage 
and the deliberate creation of a culture of fear, and the public m ay be 
m anipulated into consenting to questionable policy. As previously 
discussed, focusing events are viewed as the key to opening the door to 
new policy—they highlight policy failures and provide opportunities for 
“solving” existing problems (Birkland, 2004). It is proposed that in the 
im m ediate wake of focusing events (such as the attacks of September 11, 
2001), a culture of fear is c reated by the cooperative  efforts of the 
governm ent and the media, creating a boost in public confidence  in the 
government. This boost in con fidence  may serve as a w indow  of 
opportunity for passing questionable policy that would otherwise face  
dissent -  for example, policies that suspend our civil liberties and strip us of 
our freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If fhis is 
indeed the case, it would provide an explanation for the ease with which
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the USA PATRIOT Act passed into law  following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.
If fear can be used to increase confidence, even if the increase is 
short-lived and its effects fade over time, it is possible that a corrupt 
politician or governm ent agency cou ld  harness this fear in order to drive 
their own agenda. Further, such fear and passiveness tow ard the 
revocation of civil liberties could eventually, if left unchecked and 
unquestioned, becom e a detrim ent to dem ocracy itself.
Although there are limitations within the da ta  set and many of the 
findings were contrary to the hypotheses set forth in this research, 
television viewing is significantly related to fear and fear is significantly 
related to confidence in fhe governm ent. The smallness o f the findings in 
this study does not suggest that television viewing has no im pact 
whatsoever on the level of fear of viewers. However, it does reveal the 
need for more thorough investigations into how television consumption, 
fear and confidence in the governm ent are related. More research, 
particularly content analysis, is required to determ ine the relation 
between media consumption, fear and confidence in the government. 
Further studies should seek to determ ine the relation, if any, betw een 
cultivation effects of television in the im m ediate wake of focusing events 
and confidence in the governm ent as well.
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List o f  R efe r e n c e s
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